‘As You Set out for Ithaka’: Practical, Epistemological, Ethical, and Existential Questions about Socio-Legal Empirical Research in Conflict by Nouwen, Sarah
 1 
 
‘As you set out for Ithaka’: Practical, epistemological, ethical and existential questions 
about socio-legal empirical research in conflict 
Sarah M.H. Nouwen
*
 
Abstract 
This is the story behind another story. Inspired by the anthropological practice of reflexivity, 
it traces some practical, epistemological, ethical and existential questions behind a book 
based on empirical socio-legal research into international criminal law in situations of 
conflict. The challenges involved in such research are at times impossible to overcome. 
Indeed, the challenges may be such that the researcher will never be able to answer her 
original question fully and confidently. However, challenges can be findings in themselves. 
They may reveal insights into the role of law in a society, the limitations of vocabularies, the 
overexposure of international criminal law and inequalities in global knowledge production. 
Rather than merely obstructing research into a topical issue, challenges may shift the 
researcher’s attention to other, more fundamental, questions. Nonetheless, understanding 
challenges as findings does not resolve the existential problem of the researcher’s possible 
complicity in maintaining the very challenges that she analyses and perhaps ambitiously tries 
to overcome.  
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Ithaka 
 
As you set out for Ithaka 
hope your road is a long one, 
full of adventure, full of discovery. 
… 
C.P. Cavafy
1
 
 
 
1. The making of: the story behind the ‘official’ story 
Compared to the massive body of literature on the law applied and made by international 
criminal tribunals, empirical research on the work of the tribunals is scarce.
2
 This is 
remarkable: after all, the job of international criminal tribunals itself is, or should be,
3
 largely 
empirical. Criminal trials should primarily be about establishing who did what to whom, 
where, when and with what justification (if any).
4
 The investigator in international criminal 
trials and the empirical researcher thus appear to share important objectives: finding truth and 
dismissing myths.  
Empirical research has been particularly scarce when it concerns the effects of the 
enforcement of international criminal law.
5
 Writing on the impact of transitional justice on 
                                                          
1
 C.P. Cavafy, Collected Poems, edited by G. Savidis and translated by E. Keeley and Ph. Sherrard (1975), 67. 
The poem continues with the verses that are cited throughout this article. 
2
 J. Jackson and Y. M’Boge, ‘Integrating a Socio-Legal Approach to Evidence in the International Criminal 
Tribunals: Editors’ Introduction’, (2013) 26 LJIL 33. The present article was written for the conference 
‘Integrating a Socio-Legal Approach to Evidence in International Criminal Tribunals’, organised by University 
College Dublin on 19 November 2011, which led to LJIL’s special issue on empirical research in international 
criminal law (2013) 26 LJIL and (2014) 27 LJIL.   
3
 But see, on a different reality, N.A. Combs, Fact-Finding without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary 
Foundations of International Criminal Convictions (2010). 
4
 The empirical work of international criminal tribunals has received remarkably little attention in the literature. 
For some welcome exceptions, see Combs, ibid., X. Agirre Aranburu, ‘Methodology for the Criminal 
Investigation of International Crimes’, in A. Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal 
Justice – an Interdisciplinary Approach (2010) 355-381 and X. Agirre Aranburu, ‘Sexual Violence Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt: Using Pattern Evidence and Analysis for International Cases’, (2010) 23(3) LJIL 609.  
5
 To state that such research has been scarce is not the same as suggesting that it does not exist. Important 
empirical research into the impact of international criminal justice on communities affected by the crimes within 
international tribunals’ jurisdictions has begun to emerge (see, for instance, E. Stover and H. M. Weinstein, My 
Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity  (2004); J. Meernik, Justice and 
Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia, (2005) 42 Journal of Peace 
Research 271, K. L. King and J. D. Meernik, ‘Assessing the Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing International and Local Interests while Doing Justice’, in A. H. J. Swart, A. 
Zahar and G. Sluiter (eds.), The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(2011) 7, and J. N. Clark, ‘The Impact Question: The ICTY and the Restoration and Maintenance of Peace’, in 
ibid., 55).   
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victims, Harvey Weinstein uses a quote from Hannah Arendt to capture the empirical 
weakness of much of the transitional-justice literature: 
… what first appears as a hypothesis – with or without its implied alternatives, according 
to the level of sophistication – turns immediately usually after a few paragraphs, into a 
‘fact’. Which then gives birth to a whole string of similar non-facts, with the result that 
the purely speculative character of the whole enterprise is forgotten.
6
 
The same can be said for much of the literature on the justifications for international criminal 
law.
7
  
What are the conceivable reasons for the scarcity of empirical research into the effects 
of international criminal tribunals?
8
 Some possible explanations relate to the character of the 
object of research. International criminal law is not merely a field of study, but also a project. 
Many scholars in this field have invested much of their lives into this project.
9
 The question 
that Naomi Roht-Arriaza rhetorically poses to transitional-justice scholars is thus also 
pertinent for international criminal lawyers: ‘Are we too professionally invested in the very 
processes we are seeking to evaluate?’10 If the answer is ‘yes’, then the study of international 
                                                          
6
 Hannah Arendt, On Violence, 1969, 6-7, quoted in H. Weinstein, 'Victims, Transitional Justice and Social 
Reconstruction: Who Is Setting the Agenda?’, in I. Vanfraechem, A. Pemberton, N. Felix (eds.), Routledge 
International Handbook of Victimology (forthcoming, 2014).  
7
 See more elaborately, S.M.H. Nouwen, ‘Justifying Justice’, in J. Crawford and M. Koskenniemi (eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to International Law (2012) 327.  
8
 The dearth of empirical evidence for the great claims on the effects of international tribunals is particularly 
apparent in the case of international criminal tribunals, but not unique to them. Thomas Skouteris has observed a 
‘striking’ scarcity of empirical and sociological evidence for the assumptions underpinning the work of 
international tribunals more generally and on that ground challenges the unconditional narrative of ‘progress’ 
that has accompanied the proliferation of international tribunals (see T. Skouteris, ‘The New Tribunalism: 
Strategies of (De)Legitimation in the Era of International Adjudication’, XVII Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law 2006, 307, 334. See also at 352-354).  
9
 See, more elaborately, Nouwen, Justifying Justice, supra note 7. 
10
 N. Roht-Arriaza, ‘Foreword’, in H. van der Merwe, V. Baxter and A.R. Chapman (eds.), Assessing the Impact 
of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research (2009), ix. Part of the explanation for such an 
attitude on the part of lawyer-researchers may lie in the fact that the law student is not primarily taught in law as 
research, but in law as a ‘profession’. As Claude Lévi-Strauss observed with respect to the difference in the 
1920s between, on the one hand, law and medicine students and, on the other, science, arts and humanity 
students: ‘The apprentice doctors and lawyers had a profession ahead of them. Their behaviour reflected their 
delight in having left school behind and assumed a sure place in the social system. Midway between the 
undifferentiated mass of the lycée and the specialized activity which lay before them, they felt themselves in, as 
it were, the margin of life and claimed the contradictory privileges of the schoolboy and of the professional man 
alike. Where letters and the sciences are concerned, on the other hand, the usual outlets teaching, research-work, 
and a variety of ill-defined careers are of quite a different character. The student who chooses them does not say 
good-bye to the world of childhood: on the contrary he hopes to remain behind in it. Teaching is, after all, the 
only way in which grown-ups can stay on at school. Those who read letters or the sciences are characterized by 
resistance to the demands of the group. Like members, almost, of some monastic order they tend to turn more 
and more in upon themselves, absorbed in the study, preservation, and transmission of a patrimony independent 
of their own time: as for the future savant, his task will last as long as the universe itself. So that nothing is more 
false than to persuade them that they are committed; even if they believe that they are committing themselves 
the commitment does not consist in accepting a given role, identifying themselves with one of its functions, and 
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criminal law may in fact be very close to advocacy for international criminal law. In general 
terms, advocacy and research are both interested in empirical facts. However, where good 
empirical research is interested in the facts for the sake of evaluation of those facts (which 
may not be the case if the researcher is wedded to proving a predetermined theoretical 
framework) good advocacy selects and uses these facts strategically.
11
 If international 
criminal law is considered not merely a project, but, as David Koller has argued, a faith, fact-
finding is hardly necessary.
12
  
Another characteristic of the field that discourages interest in empirical research into its 
effects is the prominence of the deontological rationale. Accordingly, criminal justice must be 
done, irrespective of its consequences. And yet, even the supporters of deontological 
arguments often also make grand consequentialist claims as to what values other than 
retribution international criminal trials promote: truth, victims’ healing, reconciliation, the 
rule of law, peace, and so on.
13
 These claims do call for empirical evidence: (what) is the 
enforcement of international criminal law delivering? 
The ‘delivery’ question leads to another possible explanation for resistance to empirical 
research. In a day and age in which everything has to be indexed, counted and measured,
14
 
‘empirical’ is often misread as ‘quantitative’.15 Quantitative research requires countable data. 
When what matters is what is countable,
16
 what is countable determines what matters: the 
availability of datasets rather than the importance of issues begins to set the research agenda.  
Empirical research that is limited to indexing, quantifying and counting thus risks 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
accepting its ups and downs and the risks in which it may involve them. They still judge it from outside, and as 
if they were not themselves part of it. Their commitment is, in fact, a particular way of remaining uncommitted. 
Teaching and research have nothing in common, as they see it, with apprenticeship to a profession. Their 
splendours reside, as do also their miseries, in their being a refuge, on the one hand, or a mission, on the other.’ 
(C. Lévi-Strauss (translated by J. Russell), Tristes Tropiques (1961 (1955)), 57-8).  
11
 See also M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (1998) 30 (‘Like epistemic communities, 
transnational advocacy networks rely on information, but for them it is the interpretation and strategic use of 
information that is most important.’) 
12
 D. Koller, ‘The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’, (2008) 40(4) NYUJILP 1019. See also Nouwen, 
Justifying Justice, supra note 7.  
13
 See, inter plurima alia, www.icty.org/sid/324, 
www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx, and L. Moreno-Ocampo, ‘Building a 
Future on Peace and Justice’ (Nuremberg, 24 and 25 June 2007). On the grand claims and little empirical 
evidence in international criminal law, see also H.M. Weinstein and E. Stover, ‘Introduction: Conflict, Justice 
and Reclamation’, in Stover and Weinstein, supra note 5, 1 at 4 and 27. 
14
 See S.E. Merry, ‘Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance’, (2011) 52(S3) 
Current Anthropology S83. 
15
 See John Conley’s comment on S.E. Merry in ibid., S92.  
16
 The corporate mind-set has not left international criminal justice unaffected—the language of market 
rationality is already used to ‘sell’ international criminal justice to ‘donors’. See S. Kendall, ‘Donors’ Justice: 
Recasting International Criminal Accountability’, (2011) 24 LJIL 585. 
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misrepresenting an inherently political concept such as ‘justice’ as a value-neutral unit that 
can be multiplied by the application of technical expertise.
17
 Exclusively quantitative research 
into the effects of international criminal justice is thus rightly resisted. However, there is a 
long and rich history of empirical research that is not purely quantitative. Why does 
qualitative research on the effects of the enforcement of international criminal law also 
remain limited?  
One explanation may lie in the wide-ranging challenges that confront the empirical socio-
legal researcher on multiple registers, especially when the research takes place in conflict 
situations. Practically, empirical socio-legal field research requires huge amounts of resources 
and time.
18
 Epistemologically, it suffers from the perennial identity crisis of social science as 
a science, given the limitations on its ability to demonstrate causality with anything like the 
certainty of natural sciences. Ethically, the context of research in situations of (post-)conflict 
continuously confronts the researcher with most difficult questions. Existentially, empirical 
socio-legal field research can shake up the most basic assumptions, hopes and expectations of 
the fieldworker, especially if the fieldworker has been trained as an international criminal 
lawyer. The challenges are huge, precisely because empirical socio-legal research takes place 
in the midst of a social world that is continuously changing and filled with contradictions, 
uncertainties and inconsistencies. In conflict situations, the social world within which 
international criminal law mostly operates, the challenges are even more daunting.
19
 
And yet, the interest in, and students’ desire to do, fieldwork into the effects of 
international criminal courts seems to increase. How should the discipline of international 
criminal law then respond to these challenges? Accept them as insurmountable impediments 
to qualitative research into the effects of international criminal courts and therefore 
discourage such research? Accept them as insurmountable impediments that disqualify the 
                                                          
17
 See Merry, supra note 14, and T. Krever, ‘Quantifying Law: Legal Indicator Projects and the Reproduction of 
Neoliberal Common Sense’, (2013) 34(1) Third World Quarterly 131.  
18
 I am indebted to the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the Bartle Frere Fund, Emmanuel College, the 
Gates Cambridge Trust, Pembroke College, the Yorke Fund, the UAC of Nigeria Travel Fund and the Smuts 
Fund for Commonwealth Studies for funding large parts of my research in Uganda and Sudan. 
19
 For some illustrative accounts of challenges encountered by scholars who have done fieldwork in situations of 
conflict, see S. E. Hutchinson, ‘Uncertain Ethics: Researching Civil War in Sudan’, in C. Cramer, L. Hammond 
and J. Pottier (eds.), Researching Violence in Africa: Ethical and Methodological Challenges (2011) 79, A. 
Ross, ‘Impact on Research of Security-Seeking Behaviour’, in C.L. Sriram et al. (eds.), Surviving Field 
Research (2009) 177 and C. Nordstrom and A. C. G. M. Robben (eds.), Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary 
Studies of Violence and Survival (1995).   
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outcome of any such research? Or accept them, confront them and conduct the research, 
while publicly acknowledging the challenges?   
In choosing the last option, international criminal lawyers could benefit from the rich 
discipline of anthropology. With its strong emphasis on qualitative empirical research, 
anthropology has much to offer to the field of international criminal law. Substantively, the 
subfields of political and legal anthropology have studied conceptions of justice and dispute 
resolution since at least the 19
th
 century. Having shown how culturally informed such notions 
are at the local level, anthropology can put ideals such as ‘global justice’ in a revealing 
light.20 Secondly, since the 1980s, anthropology has enlarged its focus from specific small 
communities to structural phenomena such as violence. Seen through the lens of this body of 
literature, violence looks different than from a purely criminal-law perspective. Finally, and 
most pertinent to this article, the field of anthropology has worked hard to address and render 
explicit the challenges of fieldwork, practically and theoretically.
21
  
In the early days of anthropological fieldwork, the world would read only the ‘results’, 
without knowing much of the circumstances in which these results were obtained. Like the 
chemist who has acquired the competence to conduct experiments, the historian who knows 
how to analyse archives, or the lawyer who is able to ‘find’ the law, the anthropologist was 
supposed to have unique scientific skills to establish ‘the truth’. These skills were believed to 
consist mainly of, on the one hand, an ability to immerse oneself in a society and to develop 
an empathy that allows the anthropologist to understand how the people observed think, and 
on the other, an ability to detach and to observe objectively without having an impact on the 
object of study. The practical, epistemological, ethical and existential challenges inherent in 
fieldwork were generally not publicly revealed, since it could seem to challenge the entire 
existence of anthropology as a social ‘science’.  
Thus when Laura Bohannan published in 1954 one of the first reflexive books on the 
practice of fieldwork—revealing its serendipity, the lack of control over one’s own life, the 
it’s-all-happening-elsewhere syndrome, the experience of feeling like a child who needs to be 
                                                          
20 See, for instance, K. M. Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The ICC and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-
Saharan Africa (2009). 
21
 The literature on fieldwork is vast. For some useful texts, see the literature cited in this article and, among 
many others, S. Devereux and J. Hoddinott, Fieldwork in Developing Countries (1992), D. Spencer and J. 
Davies, Anthropological Fieldwork: A Relational Process (2010), the four volumes edited by C.J. Pole, 
Fieldwork (2005) and A.R. Stiffman, The Field Research Survival Guide (2009).  
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taught the ropes of daily life and is ridiculed for her ignorance, the desire for aloneness and 
horror for loneliness, the fear of losing one’s own culture and principles, and the tension 
between the professional requirement of being an objective observer and her human longing 
to be loved by the people she studied—she wrote it in the form of an anthropological novel 
and under a pseudonym.
22
 She ‘may have feared’, according to sociologist and lawyer David 
Riesman in his introduction to a new edition of the now famous Return to Laughter, ‘that the 
book might hurt her reputation as a competent and objective ethnographer’.23  
And indeed, when the widow of Bronislaw Malinowski, widely considered the 
anthropological archetype of the modern fieldworker and ethnographer, posthumously 
published his fieldwork diary – A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term – this shook, 
according to some colleagues, the discipline to its foundations.
24
 As Clifford Geertz argues: 
‘The myth of the chameleon fieldworker, perfectly self-tuned to his exotic surroundings, a 
walking miracle of empathy, tact, patience, and cosmopolitanism, was demolished by the 
man who had done most to create it.’25 By revealing his boredom, despair, loneliness, 
exhaustion, moodiness, ‘impure’ thinking, fixation on health, longing for the familiar, 
preoccupation with the women in his life, and occasional ill-feelings for the people he 
studied, Malinowski was seen not only to bring the validity of his own work into doubt but 
also the credibility of anthropology as a science.
26
 
However, what felt like a ‘crisis’ for one cohort of anthropologists,27 may have felt like a 
blessed relief to another. For no matter how unique and personal each and every fieldwork 
experience is, ‘in certain key ways each fieldworker does, and must’, in the words of 
anthropologist Sidney Mintz, ‘recapitulate the experiences of every other fieldworker.’28 The 
younger anthropologist who reads the diary of the discipline’s giant grandfather may heave a 
sigh of relieve, discovering that their own feelings of estrangement do not render them the 
                                                          
22
 Elenore Smith Bowen, Return to Laughter: An Anthropological Novel (1964 (1954)). A few years later, 
anthropologist Rosalie Wax published a reflexive piece under her own name (R.H. Wax, ‘Twelve Years Later: 
An Analysis of Field Experience’, (1957) 63(2) American Journal of Sociology 133). Her book manuscript on 
fieldwork, written in 1946, was at first rejected on account that it was ‘fascinating but unpublishable’; only 
twenty years later the anthropology publishers were interested in publishing her R.H. Wax, Doing Fieldwork: 
Warnings and Advice (1971) (see p. ix).  
23
 D. Riesman in Smith Bowen, supra note 22, xvi.  
24
 B. Malinowski, A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term (1967).  
25
 C. Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology (1993) 56. 
26
 See also ‘The Crisis over a western researcher and the Diary: Defending Malinowski and the Discipline’, 
http://classes.yale.edu/03-04/anth500b/projects/project_sites/00_Smith/DiaryCrisis.html.  
27
 Ibid.  
28
 S.M. Mintz, ‘Infant, Victim and Tourist: The Anthropologist in the Field’, (1977) 27 John Hopkins Magazine 
54, 58. 
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odd one out. Indeed, nowadays Malinowski’s Diary is often taught as a necessary 
accompaniment of his ‘official’ anthropological account.29 No longer is one the official story 
and the other the unofficial story that should remain hidden. The stories are two sides of the 
same coin. The ‘crisis over the diary’ has probably only strengthened anthropology by 
bringing the discipline closer to its own identity. 
Indeed, rather than presenting a ‘front of hard assurance, of findings or “results”’,30 many 
anthropologists nowadays discuss the practical, epistemological, ethical and existential 
‘troubles’ of doing the research, acknowledging that these have a bearing on the data 
collected and their interpretation.31 These reflexive accounts range from introductory remarks 
to an otherwise almost positivist presentation of fieldwork results
32
 to the extreme of (rather 
boring) hyper-reflexive narratives in which the navel-gazing fieldworker presents little else 
than the reality that is her own. Generally, however, anthropology’s explicit recognition of 
the subjective element has been productive.33 Whether or not as the ‘most humanistic of 
sciences and scientific of humanities’,34 anthropology has shown that it can produce unique 
and valid knowledge claims.  
In the field of international law such explicit reflexivity remains rare. This may be related 
to the object of most legal research: law. The entire practice of law is founded on the 
necessary fiction that law is external to the lawyer and that the lawyer ‘finds’, not ‘creates’, 
this law. Socio-legal research may be more open to reflexivity, but even in that branch peer 
reviewers often discourage the inclusion of reflexive accounts as ‘unsuitably autobiographical 
for a scholarly text’.35 Authors are expected to write up research by mentioning ‘the facts’, 
                                                          
29
 B. Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the 
Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea (1922).  
30
 Riesman, supra note 23, xviii.  
31
 Indeed, some anthropologists have dedicated entire books to their fieldwork experiences. For early examples 
see, in addition to Smith Bowen, H. Powdermaker, Stranger and Friend: The Way of an Anthropologist (1967),  
P. Rabinow, Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco (1977) and  J.-P. Dumont, The Headman and I: Ambiguity 
and Ambivalence in the Fieldworking Experience (1978).  
32
 For early examples of this practice, see E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of 
Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People (1940) and G. Balandier, Afrique Ambiguë (1957). For a 
more recent and more explicit example of an introductory reflexive chapter, see H. Behrend, Alice Lakwena & 
the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda, 1985-97 (1999).  
33
 For an early example, see Jean Briggs’s account Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family (1970) which, 
in a period in which reflexivity was not yet a catch-phrase, reveals how the fieldworker’s behaviour influences 
the responses she obtains from the community she studies.  
34
 American Anthropological Association, ‘Statement on Ethics: Principles of Professional Responsibilities’, 
Preamble, www.aaanet.org/profdev/ethics/upload/Statement-on-Ethics-Principles-of-Professional-
Responsibility.pdf.  
35
 This was the experience of political scientist Charli Carpenter, described in her reflexive piece  
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the theories, and possibly, the methods. The relationship between facts, theories, methods and 
the researcher, however, is rendered invisible, and so is the personal, social and political 
character of research.
36
  
But the anthropological tradition of explicit reflexivity can be reconciled with (socio-
)legal research and has much to offer, both to the reader and to the researcher.
37
 First, as a 
matter of intellectual honesty, the author’s reflexivity discloses to the reader the limitations of 
the findings, the soft side of seemingly hard data and the inherent subjectivity of the most 
objective researcher. For what Heisenberg observed with respect to physics also applies to the 
socio-legal researcher and indeed, the investigator of a criminal tribunal:
38
 the data collection 
instruments—in the case of interviews, the person who conducts the interviews—cannot but 
influence the outcome of the research.
39
 Similarly, analysis cannot be separated from the 
mind—filled with law and so much else—of the legal analyst, whether judge, advocate or 
scholar. The researcher and legal analyst cannot escape the fact that the researcher is part of 
the studied world and that her orientations will be shaped by the socio-historical locations of 
the researcher, including the values and interests that these locations confer upon 
researcher.
40
 Moreover, the researcher’s mere presence changes the world she studies. These 
inevitabilities require the humility that reflexivity imposes. Reflexivity brings the author back 
into the story by revealing his or her frame. With frames ‘shap[ing] what is viewed and how 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘“You Talk of Terrible Things So Matter-of-Factly in this Language of Science”: Constructing Human Rights in 
the Academy’, (2012) 10 Perspectives on Politics 363 at 364.  
36
 See M. Lockwood, ‘Facts or Fictions? Fieldwork Relationships and the Nature of Data’, in Devereux and 
Hoddinott (eds.), supra note 21, 164 for a similar account (and critique) of economic research.  
37
 See also Carpenter, supra note 35, for a call for more reflexivity in political science.   
38
 See M. Witteveen, ‘Closing the Gap in Truth Finding: From the Facts of the Field to the Judge’s Chambers’, 
in Smeulers (ed.), supra note 4, 383 at 406-7. 
39
 See also, inter plurima alia, Smith Bowen, supra note 22, 184-5 (‘A lecture from the past reproached me. 
“The anthropologist cannot, like the chemist or biologist, arrange controlled experiments. Like the astronomer, 
he can only observe. But unlike the astronomer, his mere presence produces changes in the data he is trying to 
observe. He himself is a disturbing influence which he must endeavor to keep to the minimum. His claim to 
science must therefore rest on a meticulous accuracy of observation and on a cool, objective approach to his 
data.”’), Powdermaker, supra note 31 at 19, F. Barth, ‘On Responsibility and Humanity: Calling a Colleague to 
Account’, (1974) 15(1) Current Anthropology  99 at 100, N. Barley, The Innocent Anthropologist: Notes from a 
Mud Hut (1983) 169, Sally Engle Merry interviewed in S. Halliday and P.D. Schmidt, Conducting Law and 
Society Research: Reflections on Methods and Practices (2009) 134, Y. Sangarasivam, ‘Researcher, Informant, 
“Assassin,” Me’, (2001) 91(1/2) American Geographical Society 95 and, more generally for social scientists, B. 
Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (2007) 28-9 and 33-34.   
40
 This phenomenon is also known as ‘reflexity’ (which is to be distinguished from the practice of ‘reflexivity’ 
discussed in this article), on which see M. Hammersley and P. Atkinson, Ethnography:Principles in Practice 
(1995) 16-21 and A. G. M. Ahmed, ‘Some Remarks from the Third World on Anthropology and Colonialism: 
The Sudan’ in T. Asad (ed.) Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (1973) 269, at 263.  
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what is viewed is interpreted’,41 reflexivity reveals the process through which the author has 
come to understand the issues the way that she does. Without the author’s public reflexivity, 
the reader sees only the scene painted by the author. The author’s public reflexivity allows 
the reader also to see the window that frames the author’s view.  
Secondly, by telling both the ‘official’ and the seemingly ‘unofficial’ story, the researcher 
can give expression to the two souls that dwell in many scholars: the one that wants to clarify 
and explain and the one that is confused by the complexity of the issues confronted. 
Fieldwork is, in the words of arch-intellectualist anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, the 
‘mother and nursemaid of doubt’: ‘This “anthropological doubt” consists not merely in 
knowing that one knows nothing but in resolutely exposing what one knows, even one’s own 
ignorance, to the insults and denials inflicted on one’s dearest ideas and habits by those ideas 
and habits which may contradict them to the highest degree.’42 Doubt fertilises understanding 
and fosters ideas.  
It is in this light that I here present elements of a story behind an ‘official’ story. ‘Official’ 
should be read in scare quotes: the ‘official’ and the ‘unofficial’ story cannot be hermetically 
separated. The unofficial story is inextricably part and constitutive of the academic narrative 
and therefore only seems ‘unofficial’. 
 The official story gives an answer to the question of whether and how the principle of 
complementarity as set forth by article 17 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) has had a catalysing effect in Uganda and Sudan.
43
 It is based on seven years of 
process tracing: treaties, statutes, cases, statements, lectures, budgets, books, newspaper 
articles, files, drafts, photographs, field notes, posters, transcripts and notes of interviews with 
over 400 people, including displaced persons, government ministers, prosecutors, 
‘traditional’ leaders,44 intelligence officers, judges, civil society actors, police, human rights 
                                                          
41
 See, in the different context of framing peace negotiations, S. Srinivasan, ‘The Politics of Negotiating Peace 
in Sudan’, in D. Curtis and G.A. Dzinesa (eds.), Peacebuilding, Power and Politics in Africa (2012) 195 at 205. 
42
 Lévi-Strauss quoted in S. Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (2009 (1961)) 73.   
43
 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, supra note *. 
44 The term ‘traditional’ leaders is used to refer to community leaders who derive their leadership position from 
cultural practices, rather than from a constitutional position in the administration of the state. The term 
‘traditional’ is controversial, however, since the historical leadership role of some present ‘traditional’ leaders is 
at times contested, since ‘traditional’ leaders often also participate in the administration of the state and their 
role is at times provided for in the constitution and since the term ‘traditional’ may raise the incorrect 
impression of a static (or even more problematically, ‘backward’) practice, whereas their role, like most cultural 
practices, is contested and dynamic (see, for instance, T. Allen, ‘The International Criminal Court and the 
Invention of Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda’, (2007) 10(7) Politique Africaine 147, 156).  
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activists, peace negotiators, criminal investigators, scholars, local council representatives, 
defence lawyers, parliamentarians, army officials, prison wardens, journalists, representatives 
of embassies and international organisations and ICC suspects, were analysed with a view to 
assessing whether and how developments in Uganda and Sudan related to the ICC’s principle 
of complementarity.  
The ‘unofficial’ story, of a journey between 2005 and 2012 with several long periods of 
research in The Hague, Uganda and Sudan, is more ambiguous. It is a story of a search for 
answers and the discovery of questions—about the mission of international criminal law, 
about the authority of types of knowledge and about relations of power between unique 
individuals in and around (post-)conflict zones and a western researcher.  
Like the official story, the unofficial story draws on experiences in Uganda and Sudan. 
However, while quite a few references to places and people will follow, the point of this 
essay is not to make an argument about these two fascinating countries. For the purpose of 
this piece, it does not really matter what happened in which of the two states. Rather, the aim 
of this essay is to present some of the challenges encountered during field research into the 
effects of international criminal law.
45
 The argument is not that such research is characterised 
by challenges only. Indeed, as will be argued, the challenges themselves can be part of the 
reason for the huge sense of satisfaction to be found in fieldwork. In addition, an equally long 
essay could be written about the gratifying experiences of fieldwork that are unrelated to any 
challenge. The argument is neither that all the challenges encountered are universal. Nor is it 
that the challenges discussed are exclusive to fieldwork concerning international criminal 
law. The challenges presented are merely examples of those that can be encountered during 
field research into the effects of international criminal law and that call for further reflection.  
That reflection can come in several degrees:46 behind every unofficial story is an even 
more unofficial story (making the first unofficial story seem official), and so on, and so on. 
From this perspective this essay offers reflexivity only to the first degree; it is not ‘a diary in 
the strict sense of the term’.  
                                                          
45
 Moving between The Hague, Gulu, Khartoum, Darfur, Kampala and headquarters of international 
organisations, the study does not focus, like classic anthropology, on the culture of one community, traditionally 
a village. In terms of its mobility, this research is more like the more modern multi-sited ethnography (see G. E. 
Marcus, Ethnography Through Thick and Thin (1998)). 
46
 On ‘more reflexive than thou’ positions, see G. E. Marcus, ‘On Ideologies of Reflexivity in Contemporary 
Efforts to Remake the Human Sciences’, 15(3) Poetics Today (1994) 383, 393-4. 
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The challenges discussed are most directly relevant for the scholar doing fieldwork. But, 
as will be highlighted, the practitioner in international criminal tribunals, for instance, those 
who try to gather evidence, may be confronted with similar challenges. 
Ultimately, it is precisely the challenges that may be most meaningful, both to the 
researcher personally and to the understanding of the field of international criminal law more 
generally. The challenges can be so insurmountable that they prevent the researcher from 
finding answers to the original question. However, possibly more importantly, they may 
change the researcher’s questions. The empirical researcher’s journey then starts with one 
question and ends with more pertinent questions. And perhaps that is what the field of 
international criminal law needs most—less certainty, less conviction and more fundamental 
questions, inspired by the complex social, material and political realities of situations of 
conflict. 
This unofficial story, however, will not end on this relatively positive note: a clarion call 
for more fieldwork, ‘no matter the obstacles, do it, it’s worth it’. The narration of several 
challenges, particularly when told in the frame of Ithaka, runs the risk of confirming, 
unintentionally, Susan Sontag’s image of the fieldworker as ‘a hero’, ‘engaged in saving his 
own soul, by a curious and ambitious act of intellectual catharsis’.47 But the modern-day 
fieldworker investigating the impact of the ICC’s proceedings cannot escape a sense of 
complicity. Chasing the remains of an exotic Other before the West would have eliminated it, 
Sontag’s hero Lévi-Strauss already observed how  
[a]nthropology is not a dispassionate science like astronomy, which springs from the 
contemplation of things at a distance. It is the outcome of a historical process which has 
made the larger part of mankind subservient to the other, and during which millions of 
human beings have had their resources plundered and their institutions and beliefs 
destroyed, whilst they themselves were ruthlessly killed, thrown into bondage, and 
contaminated by diseases they were unable to resist. Anthropology is daughter to this era 
of violence: its capacity to assess more objectively the facts pertaining to the human 
condition reflects, on the epistemological level, a state of affairs in which one part of 
mankind treated the other as an object.
48
 
                                                          
47
 S. Sontag, ‘A Hero of Our Time’, New York Review of Books (1964). See also Barley, supra note 39, 10 and 
T. Swedenburg, ‘With Genet in the Palestinian Field’, in Nordstrom and Robben (eds.), supra note 19, 25. 
Sontag’s idealisation of Lévi-Strauss as fieldworker is likely to have been based on his description of fieldwork, 
as opposed to his actual fieldwork. As Paul Rabinow comments: ‘[A]s everyone knew, Lévi-Strauss was not a 
good fieldworker. The book [Tristes Tropiques] was treated by anthropologists either as a fine piece of French 
literature or, snidely and true to form, as an overcompensation for the author’s shortcomings in the bush’. 
(Rabinow, supra note 31, 4).  
48
 C. Lévi-Strauss, ‘Anthropology: Its Achievements and Future’, (1966) 7(2) Current Anthropology 124 at 126.  
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Lévi-Strauss predicted that ‘within a century or so, when the last native culture will have 
disappeared from the Earth and our only interlocutor will be the electronic computer, it will 
have become so remote that we may well doubt whether the same kind of approach [as in 
traditional anthropology] will deserve to be called “anthropology” any longer’.49 Within half 
a century, anthropology has indeed changed, but rather than having become more remote, it 
has become closer. Today’s anthropology has expanded its geographical scope to situations 
in its historical home, the west,50 where it investigates not only the Other in the Self (the 
asylum seeker, migrant, prisoner, minorities, refugees) but also what is considered the 
quintessential Self (the village community, bankers, nobility).
51
 Nonetheless, a fieldworker 
researching the effects of the ICC’s proceedings in situ cannot escape facing the ‘filth … 
thrown in the face of humanity’ during colonialism:52 the ICC has opened investigations only 
in former colonies. Observing how these states are still being ‘investigated’ by researchers 
(whether scholars or ICC employees) predominantly originating from or strongly rooted in 
the West, the fieldworker who is a national from a former colonial power, with an affiliation 
with a university in a former colonial superpower and skin colour of the colonial oppressor, is 
not merely aware that she is a ‘daughter to this era of violence’. She cannot escape a sense of 
complicity in sustaining a post-colonial division of labour in the production of knowledge, 
even if this is one of the challenges that she, perhaps ambitiously, tries to overcome. Seen in 
this light, public reflexivity is not a narcissistic exercise or a performance of what Robert 
Meister calls ‘feel[ing] good about feeling bad’;53 rather, it is the beginning of making visible 
the role of the researcher in the construction of the world.
54
  
… 
Laistrygonians, Cyclops, 
angry Poseidon—don’t be afraid of them: 
you’ll never find things like that on your way 
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high, 
as long as a rare excitement 
stirs your spirit and your body. 
Laistrygonians, Cyclops, 
                                                          
49
 Ibid., 127.  
50
 But see Wax, Doing Fieldwork, supra note 22, 23-28 on historical precedents for participant observation ‘at 
home’, including by Beatrice Potter and Max Weber.  
51
 See more elaborately on this shift, T. Hartman, ‘Beyond Sontag as a Reader of Lévi-Strauss: “Anthropologist 
as Hero”’, (2007) 9(1) Anthropology Matters Journal.  
52
 Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, supra note 10, 39.  
53
 R. Meister, After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights (2011) 73.  
54
 See, more generally on the importance that ‘intellectuals’ are aware on the consequences of their ‘brandishing 
concrete experience’, G. C. Spivak, ‘Can the Subtaltern Speak?’, in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.), Marxism 
and the Interpretation of Culture (1988) 271.  
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wild Poseidon—you won’t encounter them 
unless you bring them along inside your soul, 
unless your soul sets them up in front of you. 
….55 
 
2. ‘The law is lost’—challenges to obtaining data 
Where does one begin with empirical research into the effects of international criminal 
law? The problems begin just there: at the start. Armed conflict has seriously weakened 
already limited national data-collection capacities. The most essential base-line data are 
unavailable.
56
 Disputes rage between the national government, international organisations 
and foreign activists on seemingly basic facts such as the death toll of the conflict.
57
 Some 
data are available but inaccessible, at least to a foreign researcher, because they could be used 
in a manner contrary to the interests or wishes of the one who holds the data.
58
 Other data are 
available and accessible, but unreliable, contested or insufficiently specific.59 For instance, an 
overview provided by prosecutors in North Darfur, below on the left, contains a category of 
‘war crimes’. However, it is questionable whether that category corresponds with ‘war 
crimes’ as defined in international law: included in the domestic category of ‘war crimes’ are 
‘murder’, ‘robbery’, ‘armed robbery’, ‘violence against women’, ‘vehicle kidnapping’ and 
‘damage’, but no data are provided that could corroborate that these acts would also amount 
to war crimes in international law, for instance, information on the position of the person 
accused of having committed the crime, the position of the victim, or the context or the 
crime. An overview provided by the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in 
Gulu, below on the right, contains the charges of then recent cases (all treason) but again no 
information on the context in which the alleged crimes were committed. It is thus difficult to 
establish an increase or decrease in domestic prosecutions for conflict-related crimes on the 
                                                          
55
 Cavafy, Ithaka, supra note 1. 
56
 See also C. Bijleveld, ‘On Research Methods for International Crimes - Methodological Issues in the 
Empirical Study of International Crimes’, in Smeulers (ed.), supra note 4, 275, at 284. On the need for baseline 
data for any assessment of ‘impact’, see V. Baxter, ‘Critical Challenges for the Development of the Transitional 
Justice Research Field’, in H. van der Merwe et al., supra note 10, 325, at 326. 
57
 On the politics of Darfur death-rate statistics, see S. Dealy, ‘An Atrocity That Needs No Exaggeration’, New 
York Times, 12 August 2007, ‘Row over Number of Darfur Deaths’, BBC, 20 August 2007, O. Degomme and 
D. Guha-Sapir, ‘Patterns of Mortality Rates in Darfur Conflict’, (2010) 375 The Lancet 294, J. Hagan and W. 
Rymond-Richmond, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide (2009), Chapter 4 and  M. Mamdani, Saviors and 
Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror (Verso, London, New York, 2009). 
58
 See G. Christensen, ‘Sensitive Information: Collecting Data on Livestock and Informal Credit’, in Devereux 
and Hoddinott (eds.), supra note 21, 124 at 124.  
59
 ‘Messiness of data’ is not exclusive to conflict zones: H. M. Kritzer, ‘Conclusion: “Research Is a Messy 
Business” - An Archeology of the Craft of Sociolegal Research’, in Halliday and Schmidt (eds.), supra note 39, 
264 at 270-1 shows how it also creates problems when investigating trials in federal courts.  
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basis of these documents, since it is unclear how the cases are related to the conflict and 
whether the charges amount to conflict-related crimes in international law.
60
 In both 
situations, the actual files of the cases prove always difficult and sometimes impossible to 
obtain.  
   
Overview of crimes prosecuted in North Darfur  Cases registered with the DPP in Gulu
61
  
Data obtained through incident reporting on the basis of newspaper articles are also 
unreliable. Underreporting is likely, for instance, when, as at one stage in Sudan, the 
government orders a ban on publishing reports on criminal cases related to Darfur.
62
 
This challenge in collecting reliable data on domestic investigations and prosecutions 
of conflict-related crimes is not merely ‘academic’ (in both the meanings of scholarly and 
‘only of theoretical interest’). The Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division in 
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, which assesses whether ICC cases are or 
would be inadmissible on grounds of past or on-going domestic proceedings, faces the same 
challenge. The OTP has provided some of its data on cases in Darfur to the Security Council, 
but triangulation (the application and combination of several research methodologies in the 
study of the same phenomenon) reveals that the OTP, too, often suffers from a lack of 
accurate primary data.
63
 
                                                          
60
 The term ‘conflict-related crimes’ is used to refer to offences for which the conduct is the same as the conduct 
of the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, but which are not necessarily criminalised domestically as genocide, 
crimes against humanity or war crimes as in the Rome Statute. 
61
 Present author’s redactions. 
62
 W. Ali, ‘Sudan Bans Media from Reporting on Darfur War Crimes Cases’, Sudan Tribune, 27 March 2007. 
63
 For instance, ICC, Third Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 14 June 2006, 4, reports: ‘The Special Prosecutions Commissions 
(SPC) were established by the Chief Justice of the Sudan in January 2006’. However, the Chief Justice does not 
have the authority to establish prosecution commissions. The Commission was established by the Minister of 
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The problems with qualitative methods are no less than those with quantitative. 
Again, the question is: where to begin? For instance, in identifying interviewees, a researcher 
may be easily misled by her own understanding of the names of local institutions. The 
conception of ‘Parliament’ is an example. When an MP is asked about the disjuncture 
between the support he expresses for the ICC in the course of the interview and his silence in 
parliamentary debates, he recounts that, although he has been an MP for three years, he has 
never spoken in a parliamentary debate: the Speaker, a member of the leading party in 
government, usually refuses to give the floor to the opposition.
64
 But then again, the term 
‘opposition’ is ambiguous, too, given that at the time of the interview almost all parties in the 
national assembly are part of a Government of National Unity, formed on the basis of a 
power-sharing agreement. Similarly, it is difficult to identify ‘civil society’ when many ‘non-
governmental organisations’ are in fact so-called GONGOs, ‘governmental non-
governmental organisations’.65  
Another challenge in identifying centres of information and decision-making is that a 
person’s influence on decision-making can be unrelated to any official position. To some 
extent such influence depends on access to information. During interviews it appears that 
some government ministers, parliamentarians and traditional leaders have less exposure to 
relevant information on, for instance, a domestic trial or the on-going peace negotiations 
concerning a conflict in their country, than a researcher based overseas. Other individuals, 
however, appear to have played key roles in matters seemingly outside their portfolio. In 
Uganda, a Minister of Internal Security and previously of Defence proves to have played a 
more decisive role in the referral of the conflict to the ICC than the Minister of Justice or 
Foreign Affairs. He appears to be the ‘Super Minister’, on account of the fact that he 
frequently heads several ministries at the same time and has direct access to the President. 
Elsewhere, in Sudan, both the government and the rebel movements use spokespersons who 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Justice (Decision No. 9/2005 Establishing a Committee of Prosecution for Special Criminal Cases in Darfur 
2005). Following the creation of two additional special courts, he divided the prosecution team into three teams. 
64
 Interview with an MP, Khartoum, November 2008. Other parliamentarians have been put in jail for 
expressing their views (interview with another MP, Khartoum, November 2008). 
65
 On Sudanese GONGOs, see G. Farred, ‘The End of Violence: Against Civil Society’, in S.M. Hassan and 
C.E. Ray (eds.), Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader (2009) 311, at 312. 
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can, in perfect English, appease western interlocutors, while behind the scenes other 
members, frequently not speaking any English, pull the strings in a different direction.66  
The researcher’s lack of command of local languages is thus another fundamental 
limitation. A specific complication is that words relevant to the research—justice, court—
may not exist as such in some of the key local languages.
67
 Reliance on interpreters brings its 
own problems.
68
 In conflict zones, hardly any interpreter is not, or is not seen to be, with a 
party to the conflict, or with an international organisation accused of taking sides. The mere 
presence of the interpreter can thus influence the interviewee’s answers. Moreover, 
interpreters ‘interpret’, and they do so in accordance with what they consider relevant, 
emphasising some parts of a discussion and leaving out the rest. It is thus that a fifteen-
minute and passionate oration can get interpreted in one short sentence: the interpreter has 
dismissed the other fourteen minutes and 50 seconds of the response to the question as 
‘nonsense’. Written material is not necessarily more reliable. Of one Act, the English and 
Arabic versions fail to correspond, in a country in which both are official languages.  
One discovers the discrepancy only if one has access to the Acts—something not to 
be taken for granted when even national lawyers are told that they are not allowed to see the 
legal instruments of which they read in the newspapers.
69
 ‘Why would we give it to you, a 
foreigner?’ an official queries.70 In ministries and libraries, laws are promised, but after 
several visits the documents are not provided for various stated reasons, for example that ‘the 
archivist is still on holiday’, ‘the books are too heavy for the photocopier’ and ‘the law is 
lost’.71 
                                                          
66
 On the politics of spokespersons, see also U. Ukiwo, ‘Hidden Agendas in Conflict Research: Informants’ 
Interests and Research Objectivity in the Niger Delta’, in Cramer, Hammond and Pottier (eds.), supra note 19, 
137, at 150.  
67
 See also Witteveen, supra note 38, 401 and, more generally on interpretation problems in the context of court 
proceedings Combs, supra note 3, Chapter 3. For a classic account of the difficulties involved in translating 
concepts, see Laura Bohannan, ‘Shakespeare in the Bush’, (1966) 75 Natural History Magazine 462.  
68
 At the same time, interpreters can bring enormous benefits, including enhancing access to information. On the 
dual role of interpreters and informants more generally, see H. C. Buechler, ‘The Social Position of an 
Ethnographer in the Field’, in F. Henry and S. Saberwal (eds.), Stress and Response in Fieldwork (1969) 7.  
69
 Discussion with Sudanese lawyers, Khartoum, October 2008. When asked for the decree appointing a Special 
Prosecutor for Darfur, one political analyst observed (interview, Khartoum, October 2008): ‘These decrees are 
always kept secret. … They never declare his jurisdiction. So many committees are set up. You hear about their 
establishment, but not about their work. You cannot access what they do.’  
70
 Fieldnotes, November 2008. 
71
 Fieldnotes, November and December 2008.  
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‘The books are too heavy for the photocopier.’  ‘The law is lost.’  
  
Even requesting official documents can be a liability. When asked for specific 
legislation, officials in the legislation department of the relevant ministry suspiciously retort, 
‘Why do you need this Act?’72 Their response is a reflection less of a general unwillingness 
to help out than of a fear of being associated with someone who is researching politically 
sensitive topics. Similar difficulties arise with respect to case-law that is published only when 
it does not embarrass the government
73
 and where the records of the case are sometimes 
accessible … and sometimes not. The researcher ends up having recourse to informal copies 
of Acts or using interviews to ascertain the content of case-law—blasphemous methods in the 
eyes of a formalistically trained lawyer.  
Interviews carry their own problems, many of which relate to the features of the 
interviewer. Naturally, wherever I go and ask hundreds of questions, people also ask 
something about me: nationality, marital status, job, number of children. My keywords ‘law’, 
‘PhD’, ‘UK’, ‘Holland’ sometimes set the scene for a buoyant interview (‘Law in the UK? 
Look at all my textbooks on English law!’; ‘Holland? Van Basten, Gullit, Van Nistelrooy!’).74 
But at other times these few words immediately put me in a defensive position. Like the Nuer 
associated Evans-Pritchard with the British coloniser (‘You raid us’; ‘You overcame us with 
firearms and we had only spears’),75 today’s Sudanese associate me with the reputation of 
                                                          
72
 Fieldnotes, November 2008. 
73
 Interview with a law professor, Khartoum, November 2008.  
74
 On the practice of seduction by suggesting national ties, see also A. C. G. M. Robben, ‘The Politics of Truth 
and Emotion among Victims and Perpetrators of Violence’, in Nordstrom and Robben (eds.), supra note 19, 81, 
at 89.  
75
 Evans-Pritchard, supra note 32, 11. On reasons for hostility towards the fieldworker, see also J. C. Faris, ‘Pax 
Britannica and the Sudan: S. F. Naudel’, in Asad (ed.), supra note 40, 153, at 160.  
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today’s Dutch: ‘Your football is foul play’,76 ‘You supported the invasion of Iraq’,77 ‘Your 
politicians demonise Islam’78 and ‘You burn illegal immigrants’.79 Also without keywords, 
my appearances create an association with ‘The West’ that is remembered for its colonialism 
and recognised in its continuing efforts to manage Africa.80  
The political sensitivity of the research topic carries its own problems. A Sudanese 
friend advises:  
The less you mention the word ICC, the better. As a Dutch person, you should not use the 
term at all.
81
  
While the government already has ‘a tendency to describe foreigners as spies’,82 my 
nationality exacerbates the risk of expulsion. Some Sudanese officials believe that the Dutch 
have extra influence on the ICC because of its seat in The Hague.83 For other reasons, too, it 
is sometimes better not to be closely associated with the research topic. A researcher on the 
ICC is generally believed to be a researcher of the ICC, or at least pro ICC.84 Quite some 
creativity is required to reconcile the advice never to utter the word ‘ICC’ with the imperative 
of informed consent.
85
 
                                                          
76
 ‘BBC pundits on World Cup final’, BBC, 12 July 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/world_cup_2010/8808636.stm. 
77
 ‘Europe and Iraq: Who stands where?’, BBC, 29 January 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2698153.stm. 
78
 ‘Dutch MP posts Islam film on web’, BBC, 27 March 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7317506.stm. 
79
 See ‘Dutch government blamed for fire’, BBC, 5 September 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5315870.stm.  
80
 For other dilemmas involved in self-representation, see S. Brown, ‘Dilemmas of Self-Representation and 
Conduct in the Field’, in Sriram et al. (eds.), supra note 19, 213.  
81
 Fieldnotes, November 2008.  
82
 Interview with a senior judge, Khartoum, November 2008. Fieldworkers generally have often been associated 
with spies, since they seem to be able to afford spending endless time talking with people. See also Wax, 
‘Twelve Years Later’, supra note 22, 135 and 140 and J. A. Sluka, ‘Reflections on Managing Danger in 
Fieldwork’, in Nordstrom and Robben (eds.), supra note 19, 276, at 283. 
83
 This belief is fostered by diplomats who suggest having unique information from the ICC. See A. Fernandez, 
‘Articles 17 and 19 of the Rome Statute: Sudan’s Legal System Unlikely to Be of Help to President Bashir’, 
08khartoum1717, 26 November 2008, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08KHARTOUM1717.html, para. 7.  
84
 Cf. Sluka, supra note 82, 276, at 289, referring to work done by Henslin (1972:55):  ‘if you do research on 
drug users or homosexuality, you may fall under suspicion of being a drug user or homosexual yourself. If you 
do research on a political movement, some, particularly those opposed to that movement, may believe that you 
are a partisan. The more political or controversial a subject one researches, the more likely one is to be 
suspected of bias or partisanship.’ 
85
 See also the experience of J. C. Kovats-Bernat, ‘Negotiating Dangerous Fields: Pragmatic Strategies for 
Fieldwork Amid Violence and Terror’, (2002) 104(1) American Anthropologist 215 and Ross, supra note 19, 
184. On informed consent, see, for instance, American Anthropological Association, ‘Statement on Ethics: 
Principles of Professional Responsibilities’, supra note 34, principle 3 and Association of Social 
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Research fatigue on the part of interlocutors and informants poses another challenge. 
One Acholi informant welcomes me, saying: ‘Are you yet another student writing a PhD on 
our backs?’86 Relatively safe since 2004, northern Uganda has attracted hordes of researchers 
working on post-conflict issues (not unlike how post-1994 Rwanda became the research 
paradise for PhDs on transitional justice). No matter how interesting the researcher’s 
questions (on human rights violations in camps for internally displaced persons, reintegration 
of child soldiers, amnesty, militarisation, ‘traditional justice’ practices, levels of 
reconciliation, attitudes towards ‘peace’ and ‘justice’, coping mechanisms, structures of 
violence, or the catalysing effect of complementarity for that matter) it is often the same 
people that see researchers come, ask seemingly endless questions of dubious relevance, and 
go again, never to come back. Northern Uganda has also been the site of a plethora of 
expensive workshops organised by western organisations. These activities have not only kept 
people from their work and inflated the daily subsistence allowances for participation in 
focus groups, but have also left people disillusioned with assisting in research projects given 
the lack of clear purpose and follow-up.
87
  
Even if relevant, the research findings are seldom returned to those who participated 
in the research.
88
 As one Acholi explained his reluctance again to participate in a focus group:  
When the British came, they found the Acholi open and friendly. … This honesty 
caused us bitterness and hatred from other tribes. This openness must also be a 
warning for researchers. We have given much information, but they take it away and 
we never hear back again.
89
 
Put this experience in the context of suffering under the rapacity of colonialism, of national 
elites and of armed groups, and it is clear how the researcher might be seen as ‘pillaging’ 
information, which is for some people one of their few remaining possessions. Moreover, 
people are aware of the fact that the researcher will personally profit from the data obtained,
90
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Anthropologists of the UK and the Commonwealth, ‘Ethical Guidelines for Good Research Practice’, 
www.theasa.org/ethics/Ethical_guidelines.pdf, 4. 
86
 Fieldnotes, August 2008. 
87
 See also International Bar Association Human Rights Institute, ICC Monitoring and Outreach Programme, 
First Outreach Report (June 2006), 19.  
88
 See also Baxter, supra note 56, 327, and, calling for improvement in this respect already fifty years ago, S. 
Saberwal, ‘Rapport and Resistance among the Embu of Central Kenya (1963-1964)’, in Henry and Saberwal 
(eds.), supra note 68, 47, at 62.   
89
 Discussion with a cultural leader, Gulu, September 2008.  
90
 The disturbing experience of the predatory character of fieldwork is common to many fieldworkers. See, 
amongst many others, S. Razavi, ‘Fieldwork in a Familiar Setting: The Role of Politics ...’, in Devereux and 
Hoddinott (eds.), supra note 21, 152, at 157.  
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if only in terms of professional advancement, but does not offer anything concrete in return.
91
 
Offsetting this unequal exchange by paying informants creates a host of other methodological 
challenges,
92
 including adding to perverse incentives—a phenomenon not unfamiliar to 
international criminal tribunals.
93
 
A related challenge is that of ‘feedback’.94 Interviewees, whether displaced persons or 
government ministers, are often well versed in the discourse of the outside world on the 
issues under discussion.
95
 Perceiving the interviewer as part of that outside world, they use 
that discourse to respond to her questions. For instance, possibly associating the interviewer 
with donors and technical advisors, some officials repeatedly stress in discussions on 
complementarity the importance of meeting ‘international standards’.96 Similarly, traditional 
leaders argue that traditional-justice mechanisms are not adequate because they are not 
tailored to the crime of ‘genocide’.97 These answers do not merely reflect the phenomenon 
that interlocutors adopt the language and conceptions with which they associate the 
researcher. They can also point to socially desirable or pedagogical answers, in which the 
interviewer is told what the interviewee thinks the interviewer wishes to hear or what the 
interviewee thinks the world should be like. Moreover, particularly in situations of conflict, 
the researcher is constantly being ‘seduced’ to engage with some arguments, narratives and 
people and to ignore others: interlocutors are aware that we fieldworkers, in Antonius 
Robben’s words, ‘will retell their stories and through our investiture as scientists provide 
these with the halo of objectivity that our academic status entails’.98 The ensuing reports, 
journal articles or books could be used to change international perceptions, or to advance 
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leadership claims within the group.99 One interviewee asks explicitly: ‘shall we write my 
biography together?’ 
If not given for social desirability, pedagogy, or an attempt to win the historical 
account, answers may also be part of a survival strategy.
100
 In areas of the world where visits 
by westerners often come with the potential or promise of some type of funding, the western 
researcher, too, no matter how explicitly she says she is coming with questions only, is likely 
to be seen as a key to access to services, financial resources (in particular scholarships) and 
visas. This applies not only when she jumps out of a Land Cruiser—the vehicle of aid 
agencies—in areas of poverty;101 it equally applies when she enters the centres of power. On 
the basis of her privileged appearance and business card—‘anyone who is anyone has a 
business card’102—the researcher is presumed to be part of a political, economic and 
scholarly elite, able to engage in political trades.  
If, in an attempt to avoid purely extractive research, the researcher engages in a 
dialogue and also answers the interviewee’s questions, she increases the potential for 
reactivity. On a few occasions, ministers and judges echo the researcher’s answers to their 
own previous questions.
103
 During a one-on-one interview, a key player in the Ugandan 
Justice Law and Order Sector argues that if Uganda wishes to make use of complementarity, 
its proceedings must result in punishments similar to the ones meted out by the ICC. After the 
interview, I direct the interviewee to the Colombian Peace and Justice Act, which does 
provide for domestic proceedings, but with shorter punishments than the ones likely to be 
imposed by the ICC.
104
 The next week, attending a meeting of the Ugandan Justice, Law and 
Order Sector, I hear the same person argue the precise opposite of what he said in the 
interview, now referring to the Colombian Peace and Justice Act. Indeed, he then asks me, 
although present only as an observer, to explain the Colombian Peace and Justice Act to the 
audience. My commitment to avoid purely extractive research—or possibly, my response to 
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what psychologist Ronald Wintrob has called fieldworkers’ ‘conflict over reciprocity’105—
has exacerbated the methodological problem of reactivity.  
Moreover, as Wikileaks brought home, reactivity is beyond the researcher’s control—
the information that she provides (not unlike the information she is provided with) may begin 
to live the life of a rumour spread in the children’s game ‘Telephone’ or ‘Gossip’. The leaked 
code cable reflects how a US official interpreted our discussion on complementarity. While I 
recognise some of my sentences on the ‘same case’ requirement in the ICC’s case-law on 
article 17 and the interpretation of ‘the interests of justice’ in article 53 of the Statute, the 
legal reasoning in the code cable seems to conflate the two issues and makes little sense to 
me.
106
  
Most problematic is the danger that the research might pose to persons assisting in it. 
When the issuing of an ICC arrest warrant for President Bashir was imminent, Sudanese 
human rights activists were being detained and tortured by the National Intelligence and 
Security Service on allegations of cooperation with the ICC.
107
 Because of the pervasive 
conflation between researchers on the ICC with researchers of the ICC, any public association 
with me could thus be dangerous to some of my interlocutors, in particular human rights 
activists. Not only the substance of any discussion, but also the mere fact of an encounter 
should therefore be confidential. Arranging confidential meetings becomes complicated, 
however, when it appears that human rights activists’ phones are tapped.108 Moreover, in 
Sudan, national security officers are ubiquitous, including in the university.
109
 A three-day 
chase for the recovery of a bicycle parked at the university revealed that the authorities were 
so well aware of my whereabouts in the university that they knew who stole the beloved 
means of transportation (unfortunately, this intelligence was not put to use for the recovery of 
the bike).  
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With some remarkable exceptions, officials of the United Nations peacekeeping 
missions in Sudan are more reluctant than most Sudanese to discuss anything related to the 
ICC. Their fear is that the government will interpret discussions between the UN and a 
researcher on the ICC as UN support for the ICC, potentially leading the government to 
withdraw its consent to their missions. ICC officials will recognise the same duality in the 
UN’s support for the ICC, which fluctuates between strong normative enthusiasm and at 
times practical distance, inspired by the need for peacekeeping missions not to be closely 
associated with the ICC. The ambiguity came to the fore in Lubanga, where the UN had 
handed over large amounts of evidence to the OTP, but on the condition of confidentiality.
110
 
Equally familiar to the ICC will be the armies of gatekeepers, health issues and 
mundane practicalities such as power cuts and broken generators that can bring one’s 
research, at least the research one came to do, to a standstill.
111
 Stuck for half a day in a 
traffic jam that seems escapable only by helicopter, returning for the umpteenth time to a 
department to wait for an official whose name might as well have been Godot, sleeping next 
to the lavatory in order to allow the body to relieve itself from its combat with last night’s 
street food, the researcher’s mind wanders off to Lévi-Strauss: 
Anthropology is a profession in which adventure plays no part; merely one of its 
bondages, it represents no more than a dead weight of weeks or months wasted en 
route; hours spent in idleness when one’s informant has given one the slip; hunger, 
exhaustion, illness as like as not; and those thousand and one routine duties which eat 
up most of our days to no purpose and reduce our perilous existence in the virgin 
forest to a simulacrum of military service.
112
 
After spending entire weeks on navigating multiple tiers of officialdom to obtain research 
authorisation or a permit to travel to a different part of the country, where one is subsequently 
encountered by intelligence officers with whom one still has to negotiate access, the 
fieldworker sometimes longs for the efficiency of doing research in the world of LexisNexis.  
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Glimmering through the description of many of these challenges is the gauntlet 
constituted by the risk of (perceived) ‘culture talk’, in Mahmood Mamdani’s words, and, to 
paraphrase Edward Said, ‘Meridionalism’. As coined by Mamdani, ‘culture talk’ seeks 
explanations for a deed in the culture of the doer (as opposed to ‘political talk’, which tends 
to explain the deed as a response to a political context of unaddressed grievances).
113
 
‘Orientalism’, as explored by Said, is a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and 
having authority over the Orient by making statements about it, authorising views of it, 
describing it, teaching it, settling it and ruling over it.
114
 A research project that focuses on 
the responses of two states in Africa to an international legal principle risks suggesting a 
radical distinction between the worlds of the observer and of the observed, of the author and 
of the ‘other’. The danger is that the analysis of complementarity’s effect in Uganda and 
Sudan is read not as an overview of findings, but, as in much of the literature on 
complementarity, as a contrast to an ideal that only hypothetically exists elsewhere in the 
world.
115
 The reading of the ‘official’ story would, however, become rather cumbersome if 
with each observation it highlighted that western states appear equally reluctant to prosecute 
nationals for conflict-related crimes if this could divide their societies.
116
 
The risk of perceived ‘Meridionalism’ also applies to the writing of this ‘unofficial’ 
story. This story seems to continue the colonial tradition of writing about the exploration of 
Africa as one long obstacle race. But this piece does not argue that the challenges are 
inherent in Africa; to some extent they are inherent in fieldwork; to another, they are inherent 
in the fieldwork of a European in Africa in a present shaped by the colonial encounter. I 
cannot wait for the day that an African researcher doing fieldwork on complementarity’s 
catalysing effect in The Netherlands writes her ‘unofficial’ story of challenges.   
… 
Hope your road is a long one. 
May there be many summer mornings when, 
with what pleasure, what joy, 
you enter into harbors you’re seeing for the first time; 
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations 
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to buy fine things, 
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony, 
sensual perfume of every kind— 
as many sensual perfumes as you can; 
and may you visit many Egyptian cities 
to learn and go on learning from their scholars 
…. 117 
 
3. The ‘challenge’ of ‘too much’ information 
At first sight perhaps unproblematic, the scenario in which one is given access too 
easily and too much raises its own challenges. While local colleagues are refused the most 
basic information,
118
 a government official provides me with original hand-written 
government records for photocopying outside the building—‘please return them 
tomorrow’.119 A Supreme Court judge shares his cell phone number—‘you can call me 
anytime’.120 This privilege of the exotic outsider, more specifically, it seems, that of the white 
woman from a well-known western university, is the opposite of the why-would-we-give-it-
to-you-a-foreigner treatment. But it strikes an embarrassing ring with the days in which 
British, French and Dutch anthropologists worked under the wings of colonial powers. As 
Talal Asad has argued, anthropology was ‘a feasible and effective enterprise’ as a result of 
‘the power relationship between dominating (European) and dominated (non-European) 
cultures’.121 Sovereignty may have changed hands, but the dominance reverberates. This 
privileged handling also raises ethical questions, specifically when it is based on the 
expectation that the researcher understands the principle of quid pro quo that undergirds the 
political economy. 
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‘Too much’ information has another dimension. People in camps for displaced 
persons take hours to come, meet, and talk. I have my questions, they theirs: ‘why is that ICC 
of yours investigating only the LRA [Lord’s Resistance Army] and not the Government; is 
the Government’s failure to protect us not a crime under international law?’; ‘who is going to 
execute the arrest warrants?’; ‘who is going to pay reparations, when?’ I hear myself repeat 
the OTP’s arguments, about gravity, temporal jurisdiction and legal justifications for forced 
displacement. I hear myself explain the difference between international crimes and human 
rights violations and between state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility. I hear 
myself echo arguments about the ICC’s dependence on states for executive action—indeed, 
largely on the same states that have failed to arrest the LRA over the last twenty-something 
years. I hear myself mention the Victims’ Trust Fund, its huge discretion and little money, 
and the possibility of obtaining money from rich convicted defendants … Kony? The lesser 
problem is that I, as a researcher, am sounding like an ICC outreach officer; perhaps the 
researcher always remains a teacher, albeit ideally not practising these two roles at the same 
moment. The real problem is that I hear myself fail to convince my interlocutors and myself: 
So what? I cannot supress the question that challenges the entire frame within which I 
operate: do these legal answers provide any sense of justice? 
Indeed, many interviewees are not interested in the research questions about the ICC. 
They want to tell a different story: about how an entire generation is growing up in camps for 
displaced persons, about their own views on how the conflict should be resolved, about 
requests for tiny amounts of money, to cover the costs of the transport to the interview or 
more substantial amounts, to send one grandchild to school. In between the lines is the 
overwhelming message of destruction—of lives, generations and cultures—and the surviving 
desire to regain control and rebuild. What does the researcher looking into the effects of 
article 17 of the Rome Statute do with this information? Treat it as ‘irrelevant’? 
… 
Keep Ithaka always in your mind. 
Arriving there is what you are destined for. 
But don’t hurry the journey at all. 
Better if it lasts for years, 
so you’re old by the time you reach the island, 
wealthy with all you have gained on the way, 
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich. 
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… 122 
 
 
4. Challenges as findings 
The most rewarding way to cope with some of these challenges is to see them as findings 
in themselves. For instance, in the context of stonewalling of attempts to identify the positive 
law, the response that ‘the law is lost’ is usefully indicative of the access to, and role of, 
positive law in the country more generally. Even if the researcher were to find the particular 
legal instrument, how much meaning does the instrument have if national lawyers do not 
have access to it and do not invoke it? By the same token, learning case-law through 
interviews is not the standard legal method, but one can at least be sure that this is not merely 
the case-law in the books, but the case-law that (some) lawyers know.  
Similarly, the political sensitivity of the topic ‘ICC’ may reveal something about how the 
ICC is understood, and used, in conflict situations. No matter how insistently lawyers present 
it as a judicial bastion, in conflict situations the ICC is also inherently political. In a state 
targeted by various international sanctions, ICC arrest warrants for incumbent officials are 
seen as the latest political instrument to punish a state, government and people that have 
internationally been classified as ‘rogue’. Indeed, an arrest warrant for a sitting of Head of 
State is an order for de facto regime change. Arrest warrants for rebel movements, by 
contrast, are interpreted as international legitimation of the government’s military 
counteroffensive.
123
  
Apart from saying something about the world observed, the challenges say much about 
the researcher. First, they say something about how the researcher is perceived, and thus 
about how the world that has produced her is perceived. Even when the researcher tries to act 
entirely in accordance with the objectivity that the role of academic requires her to perform, 
she cannot ditch the body that she inhabits, a body that is raced, gendered, and happens to 
have a particular nationality. That body carries a set of associations that make her appear rich, 
well-connected and partisan (‘She has a business card from Cambridge so she can provide a 
scholarship’; ‘She is white, hence rich’, ‘She is Dutch, thus supports the ICC’).  
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Secondly, the challenges reveal the researcher’s own unlimited limitations. One of them 
is the extent to which her words can do justice to the world observed. Joris Luyendijk has 
powerfully described how journalists face the same challenge, writing as he does:  
That is the trouble when you try to give an unbiased report about the Middle East: there 
are no unbiased words. So whose vocabulary to adopt? You cannot open your news item 
with a sentence that says: ‘Today in Judea and Samaria/the Palestinian territories/the 
occupied territories/the disputed territories/the liberated territories, three innocent 
Palestinians/Muslim terrorists/Arab newcomers were preemptively eliminated/brutally 
murdered/killed by the Zionist enemy/Israeli occupation troops/Israeli defence forces.’124 
This limitation is not only the researcher’s or the journalist’s, grappling with concepts such as 
‘parliament’, ‘opposition’ or ‘civil society’, but also the lawyer’s. Legal definitions 
notwithstanding, in the court room, people from different backgrounds have different 
understandings of concepts such as ‘occupation’, ‘terrorism’, ‘responsibility’ and even 
‘truth’.125  
 The methodological, epistemological and practical challenges even reveal something 
about the topic I came to study: the catalysing effect of complementarity. Take the 
methodological challenge of feedback and reactivity. The openness of some officials to my 
discourse, ideas and views appears indicative of Ugandan responsiveness to ‘norm 
entrepreneurship’126—in this context, the work conducted by activists promoting international 
norms for adoption at the domestic level—and the permeability of the system to ‘norm 
infiltration’. I encounter many Ugandan government officials citing from reports of 
international NGOs on what the Rome Statute says, rather than from the Rome Statute itself. 
In one ministry donors have ‘embedded’ transitional-justice experts who publish their reports 
under the name of the Ugandan Justice, Law and Order Sector, suggesting that the Ugandan 
government has bought into the donor-sponsored experts’ ideas. However, the norm 
‘infiltration’ does not occur without redefinition and subversion: neatly fitting within Sally 
Engle Merry’s continuum of vernacularisation,127 the name and transnational referent of 
foreign ideas—‘transitional justice’—are adopted, but with a dramatically different 
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understanding of the content of the idea. For instance, the chairman of the ‘Transitional 
Justice Working Group’ understands transitional justice to refer to justice involving short 
punishments.
128
 
More fundamentally, the practical, methodological and epistemological challenges 
taken together begin to reveal one of the key paradoxes of the entire complementarity regime 
if one takes into account that ICC investigators may face similar challenges.
129
 The Court’s 
admissibility regime is built on the realistic assumption that states are sometimes unwilling or 
unable to investigate and prosecute international crimes.
130
 However, the many instances so 
far in which ICC judges have refused to confirm charges or decided to acquit the accused 
suggest that the OTP, too, has faced many challenges in obtaining reliable data or is for other 
reasons unable or unwilling genuinely to investigate and prosecute. Indeed, in some instances 
the ICC may be less able or less willing than the state, in which case the international court is 
even more inadequate to address impunity than the state. The Statute, however, does not 
provide for this scenario; it establishes a Court that evaluates states from the perspective of 
Verantwortungsethik, an ethic of responsibility, while the Court itself is based on a politics 
inspired by Gesinnungsethik, an ethic of conviction.
131
 Not acknowledging the reality of the 
challenges that the Court, too, faces, the Statute fails to create a mechanism for comparing the 
capabilities and willingness of the state and that of the ICC.  
 The most valuable finding to the researcher perhaps stems from the seemingly 
‘irrelevant’ information.132 During a day-long focus group in Gulu on access to justice, I hear 
a lot about concepts, needs and expectations of ‘justice’, practices, institutions, obstacles and 
procedures, but nobody of the 15 participants, ranging from officials to cultural leaders, even 
utters the word ICC.
133
 When asked during the evaluation why the ICC was not mentioned, 
people explain that the ICC has nothing to do with ‘justice’. The explanations say both little 
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and much about my research question on the catalysing effect of the complementarity 
principle in the Statute of the International Criminal Court. They say very little about the 
catalysing effect of the ICC. They say much about the origins of my research question, which 
is rooted in the writings and discussions within the international-criminal-law epistemic 
community,134 not in Northern Uganda. I have asked a question that tends to reinforce the 
practices and experiences of my own field
135
 by assuming that the discipline is an appropriate 
lens for studying the world and somehow always relevant in crises.
136
 For a more locally 
relevant question, I should have used ‘participatory action research’ methods not merely for 
obtaining data, as I did, but also for identifying the research question.
137
 But this type of 
identification of research questions fits uneasily in PhD programmes, or grant schemes for 
that matter, where the opportunity to begin research depends on a proposal that is assessed for 
the project’s possible contribution to the literature.  
Soon I discover that it is not just me focusing on international criminal justice. Once 
calling for an appointment with a Ugandan expert, the response is: ‘Sarah? From Holland? 
On international criminal law? But I just made an appointment with Sarah from Holland to 
talk about international criminal law!’ Arriving for a repeat interview with a key official in 
the Ugandan International Crimes Division, I join an entire queue of western researchers, 
human rights activists and capacity-building experts, all waiting to ask the official about 
developments in the Ugandan International Crimes Division. Our project proposals, research 
questions and theoretical frameworks differ, but with almost identical questions we must look 
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and sound remarkably similar to the interviewee. A few hours later, we run into each other 
again, at the office of another key actor in the field of international criminal law in Uganda, 
and then again, at one of the few places in town where Ugandan coffee is transformed into 
western-style lattes. Like a magnet, international criminal justice has attracted human and 
financial resources of donors, policymakers and researchers. 
This concentration is consequential. Many of the researchers who focus on the ICC 
ask questions in the frame of international criminal law. The adoption of that frame also 
determined what is seen. Choosing the international-criminal-law perspective means zooming 
in on the type of violence that international criminal justice itself focuses on: violence that is 
relatively fast, relatively direct—chains of agency can still be reconstructed—and 
‘spectacular’, in the sense of impressive on the eye.  
Many interviewees in northern Uganda, by contrast, try to redirect the interviewer’s 
attention to a different type of violence which, following Ron Nixon, could be called ‘slow 
violence’, ‘a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an 
attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all.’138 Slow violence is indirect: 
the complex causality that spans time and space seems to decouple the violence from human 
agency. This covert, slow, structural violence, directed by hidden agency, is not merely a 
breeding ground for the overt, instant, individual violence that international criminal law does 
focus on:
139
 many people experience it on a daily basis as a fundamental injustice in itself.  
The eye of international criminal law, with its focus on individual attribution, does not 
see slow violence (other than, perhaps, as ‘context’ for the ‘real’ violence).140 In Northern 
Uganda, it sees killings by the LRA; it does not see a thousand people a week dying in camps 
for internally displaced persons.
141
 International criminal law sees LRA leader Joseph 
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Kony,
142
 but not the black fly-borne parasite or vitamin B6 deficiency that may be the cause 
of thousands of children dying of this ‘mysterious disease’ without scientific name that has 
victimised more than 3,000 children in Northern Uganda.
143
 International criminal law sees 
the torture that is ‘the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused’.144 It does not see 
what Chris Dolan has identified as ‘social torture’: a form of torture in which the methods 
and impacts are not immediately visible (in the words of one Ugandan, ‘This insecurity is a 
greater threat than the abductions. It is present every day but nobody sees it’) but that affects 
society as a whole and that is spurred by causal contexts rather than a single causal incident, 
of which there is no clear place (‘the whole world has become the torture chamber’), 
beginning or end (‘daily life is your torture’).145 ‘Social torture’ is committed by multiple 
actors and is self-perpetuating, so that methods and impacts become the same (as Primo Levi 
observed: ‘Anyone who has been tortured, remains tortured’), and become self-administered 
(people risking HIV tomorrow by selling sex in order to eat today).
146
 
This is not to say that international criminal law should see slow violence; there are 
more ways to see the world than through the lens of international criminal law. And while it 
is common for those who do research in conflict zones to question the relevance of their 
research compared to engaging in humanitarian support or political activism,147 there is a role 
for specialisation and the long-term picture—not everybody needs to be a Médicins sans 
Frontières doctor. The problem, however, lies in the monopolising tendencies of a 
fashionable topic: the foregrounding of international criminal justice backgrounds something 
else. The more people study Northern Uganda from the perspective of international criminal 
law, the more international criminal law becomes the frame through which the situation in 
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Northern Uganda is seen. The sharper this focus, the more blurred becomes the perspective of 
slow violence. What Arundhati Roy says about globalisation, also holds for the rise of 
international criminal law:  
… a light which shines brighter and brighter on a few people and the rest are in 
darkness, wiped out. They simply can’t be seen. … you stop seeing something and 
then, slowly, it’s not possible to see it. It never existed and there is no possibility of an 
alternative.
148
 
The overexposure of international criminal law blinds the world to slow violence and other 
injustices.149   
 Against this backdrop, the researcher’s practical issues seem to sink in an ocean of 
triviality, but even they contain important findings.150 It is precisely the personal experience 
of having to wait, plea and push for a travel permit and then still having to negotiate with 
intelligence officers to be granted access that allows the fieldworker to feel the personal and 
social states of emergency that hide behind the legal one.
151
 Sometimes it is only once one 
has left that state, enjoying a freedom that suddenly appears abnormal, that fear and its 
numbing effect relent and one realises how much it had both mind and body in its grasp. The 
difficulties in obtaining electricity, the dangers of roads and the vulnerability to diseases also 
allow the researcher to begin to experience how questions concerning health, security, 
resources and opportunities, can be more burning than her obsession with the catalysing 
effect of a principle in the Rome Statute. Indeed, such experiences widen one’s understanding 
of the concept of injustice way beyond the concept that underpins the project of international 
criminal law. Nonetheless, the ‘shared’ experience, and thus the understanding, is limited by 
decisive asymmetries. Whatever happens, ultimately, the researcher, like a tourist, can 
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usually rely on a bank account, an insurance policy, and, if worse comes to worst, a ticket 
out.
152
  
Even a run in what later appears to be a minefield, a confrontation with armed, 
aggressive and drunk ‘soldiers’, and a gas explosion that makes one land in hospital can 
provide insights. Apart from a sense of the dangers to which one’s interlocutors are exposed, 
these events may leave the researcher with what Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius Robben 
call an ‘existential shock’—a personal experience of the paradox that human lives can be 
constituted as much around their destruction as around their reconstruction.
153
 Besides 
trauma, the experience can provide a feeling of catharsis, as if the (imminence of the) 
explosion has blown away one’s own life’s irrelevancies, leaving only the pillars. An 
existential shock prompts strengthening of foundations.   
 Great challenges could thus lead to important findings, mostly in the form of new 
questions. Researchers working on international criminal tribunals have the freedom to 
decide that important questions are elsewhere, for instance, in poverty, trade relations and 
inequality. Officials working in international criminal tribunals are free to change their 
working assumptions, for instance, as to whom and what to investigate, but will continue to 
be limited by statutory boundaries. Most will thus continue to give their best within the 
parameters of their job. Some, however, captured by the other burning questions, stay ‘in the 
field’154 but change their employer, mission, and lines. 
… 
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey. 
Without her you wouldn’t have set out. 
She has nothing left to give you now. 
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 155
 
 
 
5. Beyond challenges as findings: the researcher’s complicity 
 
If the conclusion was merely that challenges must be seen as findings and that the journey 
of empirical research is more important than its destination, the unofficial story could end 
here. It would read like a Bildungsroman, setting out the tests that the researcher has defied 
and end on the happy note of a call for more fieldwork. The final note could be very 
optimistic indeed: the queue of researchers at the official’s door suggests that more and more 
researchers go through this experience.  
But the unofficial story does not end here. Lavished with knowledge obtained in 
encounters with most impressive people and enriched thanks to their generosity in time, 
insights and trust, the researcher brings home not only treasured data, but also a dose of 
‘moral confusion’.156 The echo of the greeting ‘Are you yet another student writing a PhD on 
our backs?’ continues to resonate. I may not have ‘looted’ information in the sense of 
removing it—the sources of information still have the information—but the experience of 
having been a parasite on a spree remains.  
The problem is not so much a question of my taking others’ data or trying to ‘represent’ 
others’ views in my work. The real issue is the inequality in opportunities to set the research 
agenda, analyse the data and tell the story. Only very few are in a position to make the 
journey that is empirical socio-legal research, to get to experience the challenges and to 
transform them into findings. Only very few can take the boat to Ithaka. And while 
anthropological research as such may have become more open to people from all over the 
world,157 as far as field research into the effects of the ICC is concerned, the boat, following 
the ICC, still goes in the same direction as the former colonial powers.   
The unequal access to opportunities taints the production of knowledge—only a particular 
set of people, in a particular set of circumstances, is able to shape the research agenda which 
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in turn informs policies that shape the world. These limitations on knowledge production are 
exacerbated by the discipline’s own assessment of who counts as ‘authority’.158 Take, for 
example, the authority of former Principal Judge in Uganda, Justice James Ogoola. Patiently 
and poetically, he has answered the questions of many a researcher regarding the Ugandan 
International Crimes Division [ICD, also known as UWCC], for which he laid the 
foundations. He is the authority on the topic. But when his speech on the ICD was published 
in a US law journal, the editors complemented it with footnotes. The result is two stories, one 
above the footnote line and one below, which are largely disjointed. For instance, above the 
line, Justice Ogoola writes: 
The UWCC is intended to deal with only the most serious cases arising especially out 
of the LRA conflict, namely those committed by the Commanders who gave the 
orders to the troops to commit those crimes.
16 
We estimate such cases to number only 
between five and ten, in all.
17
 The great majority of the combatants in the bush would 
return, not to face the full wrath of the UWCC, but the mechanics of the traditional 
justice system-of which we have a ‘legion’ countrywide.18  
 
Below the line, the footnotes read: 
 
16 See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternate 
Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 108 (2009) 
("In 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) issued arrest warrants for a 
handful of LRA leaders accused of crimes against humanity and other grave 
offenses."). 
17 See id. at 113 ("The ICC prosecutor duly initiated an investigation and, in July 
2005, procured arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and four other LRA leaders."). 
18 See id. at 112-13 ("In addition to military efforts, the government passed 
legislation in early 2000 offering blanket amnesty to any LRA member who agreed to 
surrender and renounce involvement with the rebellion.. . . As of August 2008, at least 
12,481 former LRA rebels had reportedly received amnesty under the Act."). 
 
Directly obvious problems are that the footnotes concern the work of the ICC, whereas the 
main text is about the UWCC, and that traditional justice is not the same thing as amnesty. 
The more fundamental question is why the editors considered it necessary to provide the 
work of a respected US scholar as ‘authority’ for, or background information to, the Ugandan 
judge’s story on the establishment of a court in which he played a key role. 
                                                          
158
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These are challenges that go beyond findings. The researcher may learn from these 
challenges and indeed, consider them findings. However, by focusing on international 
criminal justice, by appearing as a privileged researcher with access to financial and 
epistemological resources and a ticket out, the western researcher investigating 
complementarity in Uganda and Sudan is also complicit in some of the very challenges that 
she tries to overcome,
159
 in particular fundamental political, material and epistemological 
inequality. These challenges cannot be overcome merely through the conduct of more socio-
legal empirical research; they require socio-legal empirical research, and publication of that 
research, by different people.  
… 
And if you find her poor, Ithaka won’t have fooled you. 
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience, 
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.
160
  
 
6. Instead of concluding: opening up 
‘You always return confused’, a professor comments on my summing up of almost a 
year’s wandering. ‘Is it the sand and the dust of the desert that has blurred your vision? … 
Don’t worry, one day, you’ll read our books on what really happened’. History, his 
discipline, and law, mine, seem to have no time or space for the realities of chaos and 
confusion.
161
 At law conferences, it strikes me how those who have spent considerable time 
in situations of conflict, often take less absolutist positions than those who have not. 
Presenting some of my findings, I am occasionally accused of ‘nihilism’, as if universality in 
condemnation of international crimes should come with universal agreement on how to deal 
with the mess afterwards.  
Alternatively, it is implied that I have ‘gone native’, the process in which the researcher 
comes to identify more with the local area of research than with the profession of 
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anthropology,
162
 or, in my case, international law. But in my multi-sited research it is difficult 
to identify the one ‘local area of research’ with which I have come to identify:163 the displaced 
in northern Uganda, intelligence officers in Khartoum, ICC judges in The Hague, government 
officials in Kampala, human rights activists in Darfur? And yet, perhaps the fieldworker in 
international law is more exposed to accusations of going native than the modern-day (and 
post-positivist) anthropologist. ‘To an ethnographer sorting through the machinery of distant 
ideas’, in Clifford Geertz’s ideal of fieldwork, ‘the shapes of knowledge are always 
ineluctably local, indivisible from their instruments and their encasements’.164 In contrast, 
international criminal law, not unlike old-fashioned anthropology, usually seeks that what is 
universal—global knowledge. The most difficult challenge may reside not ‘in the field’ but 
‘at home’, not in doing the research, but in revisiting my assumptions, in reaching nuanced 
conclusions and in presenting these to the centres of power of international criminal law and 
beyond.
165
  
While the ‘official’ story may seem to have ended with the publication of a book, the 
personal fieldwork story continues to raise questions. Should international criminal law 
remain the focus of study? As Arundhati Roy asks with respect to ‘those who make a 
professional living off their expertise in poverty and despair’, ‘at what point does a scholar 
stop being a scholar and become a parasite who feeds off despair and dispossession’?166 
Perhaps every person working on genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes wonders 
this at times, particularly at those moments that one doubts that one’s article, book or 
judgment does anything to address the causes of the phenomena studied or adjudicated. 
Fieldwork, however, throws this question in one’s face. The ultimate challenge then is to find 
a way to turn ‘expertise’ into something that reverses systems of destitution, oppression and 
inequality. ‘What permanent commitments does [this fieldwork] demand of you?’167 
Ithaka is not yet in sight.  
 
                                                          
162
 C.K. Adenaike, ‘Reading the Pursuit: An Introduction’, in Adenaike and Vansina (eds.), supra note 95, xvii, 
at xxxix.  
163
 See also G. E. Marcus, ‘Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography’, 
(1995) 24 Annual Review of Anthropology 95, at 113-4.  
164
 Geertz, Local Knowledge, supra note 25, 4.  
165
 See also R.M. Shain, ‘A Double Exile: Extended African Residences and the Paradoxes of Homecoming’, in 
Adenaike and Vansina (eds.), supra note 95, 104. 
166
 A. Roy, Power Politics (2001) 26.  
167
 Manz, supra note 132, at 266.  
